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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PANEL REMARKS

IS “RELEVANT CONDUCT” RELEVANT?
RECONSIDERING THE GUIDELINES’ APPROACH TO REAL
OFFENSE SENTENCING

DAVID N. YELLEN*
The topic of this panel is the role of relevant conduct in applying the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. For those of us who have been closely
involved with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines over the years, it is
interesting to see just how pervasive they have become. On the plane out here
yesterday, I started reading Scott Turow’s new novel.1 It is about a personal
injury lawyer who is engaged in some internal revenue fraud but also has a lot
of information about some corrupt local judges. Within the first fifteen pages,
we find out that he completely acknowledges his tax crimes and although he
does not want to get involved in ratting on these judges because it will trigger
negative consequences, he is essentially forced to do so because his lawyer
takes him through the operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
lawyer shows just how long he is going to go away for unless he cooperates
with the authorities. So if it is good enough for Scott Turow, it means we are
on an interesting subject.
We are going to talk now about relevant conduct under the Guidelines. I
think it is fair to say that it continues to be the most controversial aspect of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and has been since the inception of the
Guidelines. Lay people and lawyers who do not practice in the area continue
to be amazed when they find out just the rough contours of how relevant
conduct works. In particular, when someone has (1) not been charged with a
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particular offense that they may have committed, or (2) is charged with that
offense but that charge is dropped pursuant to a plea bargain, or even (3) where
a person is charged with an offense and is acquitted of that offense, in many
circumstances the Sentencing Guidelines mandate that the sentencing judge
take into account the conduct underlying those crimes as long as the judge
believes by a preponderance of the evidence that that crime did occur. These
rules shock many people.
Now, on the one hand, there is nothing new in the Guidelines taking that
approach because, historically, the Supreme Court has said for many, many
years that a preponderance standard of evidence at sentencing is constitutional
and that therefore it is permissible to take into account acquitted conduct. After
all, an acquittal does not mean that the jury is finding that the person is
innocent of the crime, rather that the government did not prove the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
So in terms of lawyerly analysis, there is nothing inconsistent with that.
Judges have historically taken into account various things about offenders and
offenses not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. What is really radical in my
view about what the commission did with relevant conduct, however, is the
way they structured it. Let me note that there are now dozens of states that
have sentencing guidelines in one form or another and, to the best of my
knowledge, no state has adopted anything even close to the federal approach to
relevant conduct.
Now for some background. The Commission had to choose between or
fashion a compromise between what is known as “offensive of conviction” or
“charge offense” sentencing and “real offense” sentencing. In charge offense
sentencing, the entire sentence would be driven by the nature of the charge that
the defendant was convicted of. There are a lot of problems with that. We
have heard already about the power that prosecutors have to influence
sentences today. That power would be infinitely greater if the only thing that
determined a sentence was the charge of conviction; it would really be up to
the prosecutor.
The other extreme is what is known as real offense sentencing where the
judge can take into account anything the judge wants to about the offender.
What the Commission did to really simplify things is they compromised in a
variety of ways. The offense of conviction determines the starting point under
the Guidelines. So in Chapter Two of the Guidelines, the judge has to apply a
particular offense guideline that is determined based not on relevant conduct
but based on the charge of conviction: in a typical case, the count or counts in
the indictment that the defendant pleads guilty to. Once we get past there,
however, there are many aspects of the sentencing process that are more real
offense oriented. In other words, they apply this principle of relevant conduct,
for example, the amount of money involved in a robbery or a fraud, or the
amount of drugs involved or whether an injury occurred. All kinds of factors
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like that that do not have to be proven or admitted in order for a defendant to
be convicted. They play a role in determining what the sentence will be. That,
in fact, has been a fairly noncontroversial aspect of the relevant conduct
principle. The Commission tried to identify the aggravating and mitigating
factors that occur most often and assign some numerical value to that.
Then there are other aggravating and mitigating factors in Chapter Three of
the Guidelines that are essentially real offense based. Did the defendant play a
leadership or minimal role in the offense? Were there vulnerable victims? Did
the defendant accept responsibility? What is really at the heart of debate of
relevant conduct though is the Commission’s decision that in a variety of
cases, principally cases where the sentence is driven by an amount (and that
means drug cases and money cases which make up a substantial majority of the
federal criminal cases that are prosecuted); in those kind of cases, the judge is
required to base the sentence not just on the amounts involved in the count of
conviction, but also the amounts involved in any similar conducts.
Section 1(B)1.3 of the Guidelines2 states that the court must include this
conduct if it was part of the “same course of conduct” or “common scheme or
plan” as the offense of conviction. That is the critical language.
So if the defendant is a white collar defendant, pleads guilty to one count
of mail fraud which involved $5,000, but the pre-sentence report indicates and
the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that in fact the defendant
defrauded five hundred people for an amount of over a million dollars, the
judge must base the sentence on that larger amount. The judge is, of course,
limited by the statutory maximum applicable to the offense of conviction. In
applying the Guidelines, the judge will take into account not the one offense
that was admitted to or proven to at trial but rather all of this other conduct in
the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.
Two aspects of the Guidelines make this relevant conduct principle
tremendously powerful. First, the sentence is based on things that are proven
only by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, the way the Guidelines were
written, in those kinds of cases, the quantity or amount involved is really the
driving factor in the sentence. The Commission had a lot of choices to make.
It could have based the sentences on role in the offense or the defendant’s state
of mind. In drugs and money cases, however, the principal factor driving the
variance in sentences under the guidelines is quantity: the amount of money in
a fraud, the amount of drugs in a narcotics case. These two things combine to
make the relevant conduct principle exceptionally powerful.

2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (1998).

